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**AUTHORITY**

**AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGDA (M) (29 Sep 69) FOR OT UT 692228

2 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Phu Lam  
Signal Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, ADC  
Acting The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

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(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HQS, PHU LAM SIGNAL BATTALION (USASTRATCOM) (PROVISIONAL)  
APO San Francisco 96243

RGI LMB-S3

9 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969.

TO: See Distribution

1. Section 1 Operations: Significant Activities

a. A Teletype Seminar was conducted on 7 and 8 April to familiarize personnel from connected tributaries with the operation here at Phu Lam DCS Major Relay. The Seminar proved to be an effective Management tool in reducing service rates, clarification of the JANAF 128 format, and increasing personnel contact thus making future problem areas easier to work out.

b. A Special Data Section has been set up in the Teletype Relay. Each individual assigned is now extensively trained in the operation of UNIVAC 1004 to reduce our Service rates in an effort to provide better communication for the subscriber.

c. Ihu Lam Signal Battalion Ba Queo SATCOM terminal set a world record for continuous operation of an AN/MSC-46 satellite terminal with a total of 1,438 hours and 50 minutes availability without a single equipment failure.

d. An operational evaluation of Defense Communications Station Ihu Lam was conducted by DCA during the period 14 March 1969 through 19 March 1969. All facets of operation, administration and maintenance of the DCS Station were evaluated. DCS Station Ihu Lam is performing its DCS mission in a satisfactory manner.

e. Four Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) access lines from Phu Lam JOSS to WAHIAWA AUTOVON switch were activated on 4 March 1969. This increased the number of AUTOVON trunks to five total and provided better voice communications access for Southeast Asia subscribers.

2. Section 2 Lesson learned: Commanders observations, evaluations and recommendation

FOR OT UT

692228

Inclosure

RGPLMB-S3

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969.

a. Personnel: Security clearances for COMSEC repairman.

(1) Observation: Numerous 32F COMSEC repairman arrive from CONUS with only a secret clearance.

(2) Evaluation: Without a Top Secret clearance, they cannot be utilized in their MOS. Obtaining the clearance takes weeks.

(3) Recommendation: That personnel undergoing 32F MOS training be submitted for Top Secret clearance prior to completion of their school training so they will be fully qualified for field service.

b. Operations

(1) Telephone cable noise reduction

(a) Observation. Most telephone cables in RVN are installed without bonding of sheaths to ground. The resulting discontinuous shield is ineffective in stopping impulse noise and AC hum. It also presents a lighting hazard.

(b) Evaluation. Painstaking efforts to insure sheath continuity are standard in commercial telephone practice, including bonding the sheath across splices. This can be done at little extra cost during installation.

(c) Recommendation. That all new cable projects include sheath bonding and grounding as standard practice.

(2) Secure Telephone Installation

(a) Observation: Secure telephone sets are frequently installed in the office of the Commander of the organization.

(b) Evaluation: Installation of the sets in the commander's office have two major disadvantages:

1 Changing cipher, testing and trouble shooting the equipment either creates a disruption for the commander or else must be deferred until it can be done in the commander's absence. Extensive circuit testing and maintenance is difficult under these conditions.

2 Use of the equipment by Senior Staff Officers also results in an inconvenience to the commander.

If there is to be only one telephone instrument, it should be co-located with its associated equipment at a location convenient to, but not

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969.

physically inside, the commander's office. This provides easy access for ciphering, testing, trouble shooting and maintenance. If there is to be more than one instrument, the extension instrument should be installed in or near the commander's office and the second instrument installed in some area convenient to the major staff sections, but still easily available for ciphering, testing, trouble shooting and maintenance.

(c) Recommendation: That future secure voice installations be made using the criteria described above.

(3) Fire damage to Communications Lines and power cables.

(a) Observation. Grass fires around the perimeter can cause damage to electrical power cables and communications lines.

(b) Evaluations. Damage to electrical power cables around the perimeter can cause loss of perimeter and helipad lighting and aircraft obstacle warning lights. Warning lights which are not operating create a hazardous condition to helicopters and other aircraft which sometimes operate in the Battalion area at night. Loss of communications lines to bunkers and listening posts can result in serious problems in the event of an attack.

(c) Recommendations. Power cables and communications lines around perimeter or grassy areas should be buried or raised overhead on poles to prevent damage in the event a grass fire is accidentally or deliberately started. If the cables and lines cannot be buried or raised, the grass should be cleared from the cables or lines by digging up or otherwise destroying the grass.

(4) Damage to RLP Antenna.

(a) Observation. An RLP Antenna boom which will normally support the weight of a man will collapse under the weight of two men.

(b) Evaluations. An RLP Antenna boom which collapses due to a man climbing on it for maintenance purposes can result in the injury or death of the man and costly repairs to the Antenna.

(c) Recommendations. Antenna construction teams should insure that RLP Antennas are properly constructed with all bolts tightened before the Antenna is raised. RLP Antennas should be lowered

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periodically to insure that all bolts are still tight and inspect it for damage or deterioration caused by weather conditions. Under no conditions should two personnel be permitted on the boom.

(5) ASC Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) Motor Generator Failure:

(a) Observation. Extended ASC outage due to a minor UPS system failure.

(b) Evaluation. The restoration of the UPS was delayed by 3 hours and 22 minutes because a qualified UPS technician was not available on site. At most ASC's there is only 1 UPS technician assigned, and therefore there is always the risk that a failure will occur during his absence. To preclude a recurrence of this type of problem 12 key personnel are being trained by the UPS Technician on the basic trouble shooting procedures.

(c) Recommendations. Although there is only one fully qualified UPS Technician, sufficient other personnel should be cross-trained in basic UPS operations so that a relatively minor UPS failure will not automatically result in an extended outage.

c. Training. Operator's Procedure Course

(1) Observation. Newly assigned personnel needed training to familiarize them with operations within the DCS Major Torn Tape Relay.

(2) Evaluation. In order to increase the efficiency of operations at this station a Communications Center Procedure Course of Instruction has been established on a weekly basis. The course had two objectives; first, to give newly assigned personnel an introduction to the communication center and its procedures and second, to give communications center personnel previously assigned a better working knowledge and to familiarize them with all positions. Special emphasis was placed on the receive Hi-i and the UNIVAC 1004 positions.

(3) Recommendation. That a similar course of instructions, tailored to meet their current operational commitments, be instituted at other communication centers.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Observation. It is not uncommon for an electrically detonated claymore to be detonated by lighting.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Ihu Lam Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969.

(2) Evaluation. Electrical storms have been known to cause detonation of claymore mines. To minimize the hazard of a mine accidentally detonating and possibly injuring friendly troops, the following precaution can be taken:

(a) Run electrical wire from the bunker to a safe position outside the bunker that is accessible.

(b) From this position connect the electrical cap to detonating cord with masking tape.

(c) The detonating cord is connected to the claymore with a non-electric blasting cap.

(d) During the monsoon season or non-critical periods, the claymore can be quickly made inoperable by untaping the electrical cap from the detonating cord.

(e) In an electrical storm with the blasting cap separated from the detonating cord, the only risk is detonation of the electrical blasting cap.

(f) In an emergency the claymore can be made operable quickly by retaping the cap and cord.

(3) Recommendation. The risk of electric claymores being detonated by lighting can be minimized by separating claymore from electric cap with detonating cord. A minimum of time and effort is required to make the claymore operable.

e. Logistics.

(1) Cancellation of an excessive fill time of requisitions.

(a) Observation. This headquarters has experienced difficulty with the number of requisitions cancelled and the order/ship time of those requisitions not cancelled. This has caused many maintenance delays because of a wait for needed repair parts and a needless high percentage of zero balances within the Technical Supply. A 10 day sample of O2 and O5 requisitions taken from the 3rd quarter FY 69 shows the following: Of a total of 652 requisitions submitted, 269 were cancelled, 127 were total fills, 21 were partial fills and 235 were still open at the end of the 10 day survey period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1969.

(b) Evaluation. The fill time for parts that are available at depot is a relatively good 15-20 days, but this is less than 20% of the requisitions submitted. The remaining requisitions are either passed and left open or are cancelled. The group of passed requisitions now brings a truer picture of fill time. Counting this group the average fill time mentioned above can be increased 75-80 days. Those requisitions that are cancelled are in most cases caused by a loss of documentation between the depot and the ICC. The exact reason for this loss cannot be determined. Of every ten requisitions submitted, an average of four have to be resubmitted, causing double handling.

(c) Recommendation. That the level of stockage be increased to more accurately reflect the order/ship time. Also, that AR 725-50 be followed to the following extent: That all requisitions, if not on depot or ICC records, be initiated at that level, if an AFL (Followup) is received within 30 days of the requisition date. This last recommendation is not being followed at this time by depot and the ICC.

## (2) Red Ball Requisition Cancellation

(a) Observation. In nearly  $\frac{1}{2}$  of Red Ball requisitions submitted for electronic repair parts, a cancellation is made in higher supply channels. This has caused an increase in down time for greatly needed end items and systems.

(b) Evaluation. As in problem (1) above a part of the requisitions are cancelled due to loss of documentation. Of the remaining cancellations, most are for non-standard items or those not given a stock number by the commodity manager of that item. A requisition with Document Identifier Code indicating exception data (AOE) is submitted for these requirements. Experience has shown that the first source of supply will determine that the part number is valid. They have the exception data to work from. Often though, this source will change the requisition to Document Identifier Code indicating valid approved Part Number (AOB). Therefore the next source of supply cannot identify the part because of lack of exception data.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for  
Period Ending 30 April 1969.

(c) Recommendation. That AR 725-50 be followed as in (1)  
(c) above. That an AOE be perpetuated throughout the supply system, and  
that all exception data be carried forward to the next source of supply.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

*L. J. Riley*  
L. J. RILEY  
LTC, SigC  
Commanding

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
SCCPV-RG-MO (9 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for the Period  
Ending 31 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, USA Regional Communications Group (Vietnam), APO 96243

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington D.C. 20310  
Commanding General, 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM), ATTN: SCCPV-P0-CR,  
APO 96384

1. Concur with basic correspondence except as indicated below.
2. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b (1) operations. Sheath bonding and grounding are standard practices in the Republic of Vietnam. Although the cable installation agency is responsible for this work, the using unit should not accept the cable unless the bonding and grounding are completed.
3. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b (3) operations. Any cables and lines that are buried should be marked with markers that won't burn. Any raised lines or cables must be raised high enough that no damage is suffered from heat. Burying cables is preferable from a security standpoint as raised cables are more subject to shrapnel from indirect fire.
4. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2d intelligence. In addition it is suggested that non-electrical means be used during the monsoon season at sites where access is tightly controlled in order to prevent accidental detonation. The suggestions regarding the accidental detonation of claymore mines during electrical storms has been sent to the group's other subordinate battalions.
5. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2e logistics (1) & (2). Investigations of problems encountered are currently being conducted by this headquarters. Necessary corrective actions will be taken upon completion.

  
JOHN E. HOOVER  
Colonel, SigC  
Commanding

SCCPV-OP-SD (9 May 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

DA, HQ, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384

11 June 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHQG-DST, APO 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-15.


2. This headquarters has reviewed the report and concurs in it as indorsed with the following comments and/or exceptions:

a. Paragraph 2a, page 2. The recommendation was directed to the Signal School of Fort Monmouth in this months Personnel and Training letter. However, it is the Battalion's responsibility to appropriately code column 35 of DA Form 477 to indicate type of clearance required. This headquarters monitors the enlisted requisition to assure compliance.

b. Paragraph 2d, page 4. Nonconcur. The evaluation describes a rather elaborate means to minimize the hazard of accidental mine explosion during electrical storms. While this system would work when first initiated, its reliability would rapidly deteriorate with handling and exposure to the weather. If normal safety precautions are followed during electrical storms, including disconnection of the mine when possible, there should be little danger of injury to personnel. Recommend that this system using detonating cord not be employed.

c. Paragraph 2e(1) and (2), pages 5 and 6. These problems have been relayed to the Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, requesting that they be reviewed and assistance provided.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GEORGE A. KURKJIAN  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

CF:

Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command, ATTN: DCSOPS, SCC-OPS-RT, Fort Huachuca, Arizona  
Commanding Officer, USA Regional Communications Group, APO 96243  
Commanding Officer, Phu Lam Signal Battalion, APO 96243

AVNGC-DST (9 May 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for Period  
Ending 30 April 1969

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 26 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications  
Command-Pacific, APO 96557

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for  
the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, Phu Lam Signal  
Battalion (USASTRATCOM) (Provisional) and concurs with the report as  
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy fura:  
Phu Lam Sig Bn  
1st Sig Bde

*W. C. Arntz*  
W. C. ARNTZ  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

SCCP-OP (9 May 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the Phu Lam Signal Battalion for the Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

Headquarters, U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command - Pacific,  
APO San Francisco 96557 2, AUG 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs as modified by indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FRANK C. MAHIN  
COL, GS  
Chief of Staff

**GPOP-DT (9 May 69) 5th Ind**  
**SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Phu Lam Signal Battalion**  
**(USASTRATCOM) (Provisional) for Period Ending**  
**30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)**

**HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 SEP 69**

**THRU: Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications**  
**Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613**

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,**  
**Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310**

**This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward-**  
**ing indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.**

**FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:**



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
A-3 - G

**Cy furn:**  
**DA, ACSFOR**  
**CG, USASTRATCOM-PAC**

SCC-PO-CERA (9 May 69) 6th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Phu Lam Signal Battalion (USASTRATCOM)  
(Provisional) for Period Ending 30 Apr 69, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, US Army Strategic Communications Command, Fort Huachuca,  
Arizona 85613 19 SEP 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This Headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Robert A. Mall*  
ROBERT A. MALL  
Captain, AGC  
Asst Adj Gen

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Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, Phu Lam Signal Battalion

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13. ABSTRACT

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